How St Mirren's 'crazy gang' tactics disrupted Celtic and why midfield looks a new 'toxic combination'

I am always nervous about results like the 9-0 win over Dundee United. Do supporters and even players feel it is too easy? Do expectation levels get too far ahead of themselves? I doubt Ange Postecoglou would countenance such sentiment in the work environment he so carefully fosters at Lennoxtown.

Similarly, I am with him in not getting too down following a defeat nor too up following a win. A performance like Sunday’s provides a lot of food for analysis.

But we should also recognise Celtic do not exist in a buddle and on the other side of the pitch there are 11 others hell bent on stopping them.

So, what did St Mirren do well on Sunday?

Basics – Shape and Structure

The Paisley side had 15 days to prepare for the visit of the Champions.

Such time is a luxury in modern football with two matches a week and barely enough time for preparation amongst the rest and recovery days that are vital over a seasons’ slog.

What we saw was a team that had used that time wisely to be utterly focussed on that one task – stopping Celtic playing.

There is rarely anything new or innovative in football tactics. What changes is how well you execute and the appropriateness of the approach to the task.

St Mirren set up in a 5-3-2 shape:

Alan Morrison (Image: Alan Morrison)

The last team to play 5 at the back with 3 narrow in midfield? Dundee United. 9-0 was it?

Which emphasises that there are other factors beyond basic shape that are important.

Firstly spacing.

In this example, St Mirren are arranged in their 5-3-2 structure. But the key to defensive solidity is spacing.

Firstly, the five defenders are strung along the 18-yard box and not beyond it’s width. This forces Celtic wide. Wide was fine to concede ground because:

a) You will not score from the touch line

and

b) If you cross the ball in there are three six-foot monsters to get over.

Secondly, there are few gaps in the half spaces. Celtic love to get the ball to midfielders, forwards and inverted full-backs in the half spaces – that is the spaces between where the opposition are stationed and between their lines.

St Mirren successfully restricted those spaces by defending as a unit and staying narrow and compact. Barring a multi-one-touch wonder goal or a strike from 30 yards, it is very difficult to break down.

What they did skilfully, in the sense that their decision-making was spot on and consistent, was maintain the basic shape and compactness at varying levels on the pitch. That is, they did not fall back into a low block and “hold on”. Rather they pushed on as far as they could as a unit and only fell back once Celtic breached the final third.

Screenshot (Image: Screenshot)

Here is Celtic trying to take a throw-in with Taylor on their defensive third left touchline. Seven St Mirren players are in shot making it difficult for Celtic to play out.

None of the above requires expensive footballers to execute. Any professional should be able to maintain disciplined shape and structure, not least with 15 days to practise.

You Don’t Need The Ball

Celtic not only attack with pace and directness but they do so with control. It is normal for Celtic to have 70 percent or more possession in such games. You DO need good technical (i.e. expensive) footballers to match that game.

So, St Mirren were happy to not have the ball.

Statsbomb had the Buddies completing 108 passes from 203 (53 percent) whilst Celtic completed 641 from 732 (88 percent). Such a stylistic difference almost suggests these teams were playing different sports!

It is almost more dangerous for teams like St Mirren to have the ball in their own defensive third against Celtic than not. Celtic press so aggressively, losing the ball in your own final third usually presents opportunities in transition. Even Real Madrid lost possession in their own third six times in the first half recently.

But you cannot press is the other side rarely have the ball. St Mirren were not bothered about playing out from the back and risk being caught in possession. They had two strong strikers and simply launched the ball at them at the earliest opportunity.

Celtic only managed 74 pressures, the second lowest of the season.

St Mirren’s pass network map is colder than a cold night in Coldville:

Statsbomb (Image: Statsbomb)

Incredibly, Jonah Ayunga and Curtis Main were the most involved players as regards passing. Compare and contrast with Kyogo Furuhashi who rarely completes 10 passes in a match.

The two strikers essentially fought their opponents all afternoon. Again, you do not need to spend a lot of money on strength and brawn. What St Mirren did was simplify the game for the strikers. Chase, harry, bang into your opponent. It may not be pretty, but it can be effective when executed intelligently and consistently. St Mirren only used three substitutes. They stuck to plan admirably.

What helped them was that Celtic missed their consistently excellent main centre back Cameron Carter-Vickers. Instead, Welsh had a torrid time, in particular. He is not the biggest or most physical centre back. Partner Mortiz Jenz is relatively new to Scottish football peculiarities as well.  Whereas Carter-Vickers wins around 85% of aerial duels, Jenz and Welsh are nearer 75%.

St Mirren preyed on this relative weakness whilst simultaneously limiting the risk of the Celtic press.

None of this is new or original as I mentioned. If younger readers would like an exemplar on how to play this way, I recommend reading up on the Crazy Gang. You can find their, err..., 'highlights' on Youtube. It will be complete with strategic time wasting, taking 10 minutes to take a long throw-in, hiding the ball girls/boys, “buying” free kicks and every trick in between.

But you cannot blame the Buddies. It is one way to overcome a huge financial disparity in playing resources. Wimbledon survived in the English First Division for 14 years playing this way.

Other Scottish clubs could learn a thing about maximising your resources so effectively.

Self-Inflicted Misery

Of course, Celtic contrived to play a large part in their own downfall.

I was surprised the manager made as many as six changes. Given there are no games for two weeks, and on the back of an ultimately disappointing draw in Warsaw, my Postecoglou-o-meter was telling me minimal changes.

The reasons being:

1. Put right the win you left on the field on Wednesday

2. We go into the break on a high and with momentum.

Instead, six changes were made including the midfield where O’Riley and Hatate were rested for Mooy and Turnbull. We may have discovered a new “toxic combination” in midfield.

Replacing Hatate (open play Expected Assists (xA) – 0.24) with Mooy (0.16) and O’Riley (0.54) with Turnbull (0.39) whilst pushing McGregor (0.18) further forward, severely reduced precisely the quick, accurate, incisive half space passing Celtic needed in this match.

Replacing Jota (0.56) with Abada (0.23) exacerbated the creative deficit.

McGregor and Mooy are effective in progressing the ball from deep, and Turnbull’s creativity largely comes from set plays – a quality largely redundant when you are playing a team of giants.

All came on but by that stage, St Mirren had a 2-goal lead to fight for and Celtic were increasingly desperate.

The manager will learn a lot from this, and in the grand scheme of things it may be beneficial to cool the expectations and ground the players who have got used to inflicting heavy defeats on Scottish opposition.

The fundamentals have not changed for Celtic in terms of their managerial, playing and financial advantages.

This cold shower of a performance should be used wisely to regroup.

Next match up it will be Celtic who have had 15 days to prepare, also.