Why Carter-Vickers outdoing Goldson won Celtic League Cup v Rangers

History will record that Celtic’s recent run of Hampden success continued while Rangers’ record since being promoted in 2016 remains woeful. They have now lost nine of 14 matches while the Hoops have won 20 out of 23 over the same period.

The Parkhead side's 2-1 victory was not without its moments of doubt but, overall, there were few who would argue against the outcome when considering the performances. 

Joe Hart did not make a single save while the Bhoys generated 2.8 xG compared to the Ibrox side's 1.58. As always, context is important. Two of Rangers' highest xG chances came from shots that, had they gone in, would likely have been ruled out by VAR. 

In the 13th minute, John Lundstram’s shot was blocked by Cameron Carter-Vickers but the cutback from Malik Tillman had come from a ball that was clearly out of play.

Similarly, in the 79th minute, a Carl Starfelt miscalculation allowed an Antonio Colak shot to be blocked again by Carter-Vickers but the Croatian had used his arm to control the ball which would surely have contravened IFAB law 12 (scoring a goal immediately after the ball has touched their hand/arm, even if accidental).

It is not a coincidence Carter-Vickers is mentioned twice above.

Football, for all supporters, is a game of moments. We all carry our own highlights reel in our heads of each game and tend to forget the other 87 minutes or so. From an analyst's point of view, it is important to look at the 90-minute performances.

Consistency wins leagues. However in cup finals, which are nearly always tight irrespective of the opponents, moments matter.

It is the comparative defensive responses, specifically from the most respected members of each side in Carter-Vickers and Connor Goldson, that we will focus on here.

Rocks or paper?

Last week's column showed the comparative StatsBomb numbers for the two primary centre-backs.

Even where Carter-Vickers scored lower than Goldson, in possession-adjusted tackles, it could be argued this is a positive for the American. It is good for a centre-back not to make a lot of tackles if it is due to superior anticipation, positioning and communication with defensive colleagues.

“The absence of things doth a great defender make”, as William Shakespeare never said, but Franco Baresi probably did. 

What the data does not capture includes how they make decisions under pressure. In the moments that mattered were the protagonists solid as a rock or did they crumple like wrapping paper?

Big moment 1 (31st min)

Rangers probed Celtic’s left-hand side in the early exchanges, loading long balls onto Greg Taylor and Starfelt, as every club in Scotland tends to do. 

However on 31 minutes, in transition, Beale's men put some passes together to release James Tavernier on the Celtic left.

At 0-0, a loose ball in midfield results in Alfredo Morelos finding Ryan Kent dropping into the ‘10’ space. In this transition moment, Reo Hatate has allowed James Tavernier to run off him exposing Celtic’s left. However, Celtic have numbers to cover the danger providing Carl Starfelt and Greg Taylor maintain shape.

Unfortunately, Starfelt makes the incredibly poor decision to chase the ball rather than hold shape and cover if Taylor cannot fully recover to block Tavernier. Carter-Vickers is watching man and ball as he should be – what does he then do to respond to his partner’s error?

Taylor cannot get across to Tavernier quickly enough – his lack of recovery pace being one of the Celtic defence’s inherent weaknesses. Carter-Vickers continues to monitor man and ball and moves to cover the front post area abdicated by Starfelt.

Tavernier’s cross makes it past Taylor, but Carter-Vickers has covered the danger zone at the near post and shown the strength and speed necessary to get to the ball ahead of Fashion Sakala. The ball is intercepted just wide of the post whilst Starfelt has still not recovered his position.

The reason teams attack the champions' left side was writ large in this moment; Reo Hatate’s failure to track back, Taylor’s lack of recovery pace and Starfelt’s propensity for over-optimistic and over-aggressive defensive actions all pull the team out of shape.

Carter-Vickers, through calmness, cold-hearted decision making and athleticism mitigated all of that.

Big moment 2 (44th min)

Celtic opened the scoring just before half-time - a brilliant moment to score as it changed the dynamic going into the break. The goal provided a fascinating counterpoint to the above incident.

Celtic work the ball into Aaron Mooy, who has shifted from his right-sided starting position onto the left side to overload the Rangers midfield.

It looks like Lundstram is tracking Taylor, and Tavernier realises this. Only Lundstram has made it goal-side at this moment, so there is imminent danger. Goldson recognises that, raises his arm and issues audibly to his colleagues.

Lundstram has failed to cover Taylor, meaning Tavernier has to pull over but has too much ground to make up.

Daizen Maeda’s run has distracted Goldson but, in any case, he is too slow in turning and running back to guard the key front post area. Ben Davies, consequently, can see the front-post risk and has taken his eyes off Kyogo Furuhashi, who is behind him.

With Goldson, this isn’t necessarily a question of decision-making, it is simply the lack of physical ability and/or effort to get back into position and cut off anything that bypasses Tavernier.

Tavernier fails to block Taylor’s cross and Goldson fails to make it back to cover the front post or Maeda. Davies has no idea where Furuhashi is and he has to cover Goldson’s area at the front post.

There is a systemic failure of the Rangers midfield to recover and track runners. Mooy’s movements disrupt the team shape but many players react poorly.

The counterpoint to Carter-Vickers is Goldson’s decision to leave his station in anticipation of covering the exposed Tavernier but failing to recover with sufficient intensity even to manage that, never mind guarding his front post. Davies is pulled out of shape and this gives Kyogo his first goal.

Big moment 3 (56th min)

Incredibly, the same systemic weaknesses regarding midfield tracking and defensive decision-making were stress tested again on 56 minutes in similar circumstances.

Rangers have just missed chances from Kent and Sakala. The Celtic build-up once again sees Mooy drift over to create an overload on the Rangers right. Tillman has already failed to track Mooy’s run.

The Ibrox side's defence, and Goldson in particular, look reasonably well set.

Despite being the nominal holding midfielder, Callum McGregor makes the decision to attack the space ahead of him. Neither Kent nor Morelos react quickly to this.

Glen Kamara jumps towards the ball to try and stop McGregor’s advance. Also, Lundstram is distracted and is clearly ball-watching which allows Hatate to slip behind him off toward the inside left position.

McGregor’s pass finds Mooy who is goal-side of the labouring Tillman. Davies is ball-watching rather than Furuhashi-watching.

Goldson now has a decision to make given the poor ones made by his other team-mates ahead of him.

Goldson, who was facing onto the play in the previous frame, decides to turn his body away from the direction of the ball, thus rendering him incapable of influencing Hatate's reception of the through ball from Mooy.

Davies, despite Goldson and Tavernier covering numbers-wise, sprints away from Furuhashi leaving him to Borna Barisic, who is at least goal-side. Jota is unmarked.

Because Goldson is facing the wrong way, it costs him valuable time to turn and face up Hatate and attempt to stop the shot or cross.

Tavernier has lost ground completely and Davies has been drawn towards defending the near post where Goldson should be.

Hatate smartly elects to cross rather than shoot from a narrow angle and the final systemic weakness is manifest as Furuhashi once again leaves Barisic on his behind at the back post with the ball in the net.

Goldson gets his body shape all wrong which allows Hatate to run off him. Like Carter-Vickers before him, he is put in this position due to the errors of others making poor decisions (such as both Kamara and Lundstram being attracted to the ball and Tillman failing to match Mooy’s run).

As Carter-Vickers showed, it is possible to recover such systemic breakdowns with concentration and speed of movement. 

However Goldson, in particular, failed to put out the fires on those two occasions and indeed made bad situations worse. 

And in those moments, the cup was won and lost.